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THE LIMITS IN OPEN CODE: REGULATORY
STANDARDS  AND THE FUTURE OF THE NET
By Lawrence Lessig t
ABSTRACT
This essay  considers  the effect  of the  open  source  software  move-
ment on government's  ability to regulate  the Net. Its  claim is that  an in-
crease in open source  software within the application  space  of the Inter-
net decreases the government's power to regulate.
This is an essay about standards in the future of the Internet's  govern-
ance.  I begin  with  a distinction  between  two types  of standards,  and  then
continue  with  a  reminder  of  a bit of history  of the  evolution  of thought
about regulation  in cyberspace.  I then draw  upon  this distinction  and this
history to suggest a question about the  future of the Net's regulation. This
question relates  to  the  place of open  source software  in the future  of the
"application  space" of the Internet. My argument  is that open source  soft-
ware  will  make  regulating  cyberspace  more  difficult  than  it  otherwise
would be.
I.  STANDARDS
Distinguish between  two sorts of standards:  coordinating  and regulat-
ing. A coordinating  standard is a rule that facilitates  an activity  that other-
wise  would not exist. A regulating  standard restricts  behavior within  that
activity,  according  to a policy set by the regulators.  A coordinating  stan-
dard can  be imposed from the top down, or emerge from the bottom up;  a
regulating standard is ordinarily imposed only from the top down. Driving
on the right side of the road is  a coordinating  standard. A speed limit is  a
regulating  standard.  Coordinating  standards  limit  liberty  (drive  on  the
right) to make an activity possible (driving); regulating  standards limit lib-
erty within that  activity (speeding)  to advance  a regulatory  end (safety or
©  1999 Lawrence Lessig.
t  Jack  N.  and  Lillian  R.  Berkman  Professor  for  Entrepreneurial  Legal  Studies,
Harvard Law School. This essay  is drawn from a lecture. Thanks  to Susan  Freiwald and
Joel Reidenberg  for pointing out the implications of this argument for regulation  interna-
tionally. Thanks to Karen King for her research  support.BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
fuel conservation).  We understand why an individual  would want to devi-
ate from  a regulating  standard;  it is (often) hard to make  sense of a desire
to deviate from a coordinating standard.
Standards  on a computer network  are  similarly coordinating  and regu-
lating.  TCP/IP is  a coordinating  standard-it  is  a convention  that  makes
exchange of information over the Internet possible.'  Space allocation on a
network  server  is  a  regulating  standard-it  limits  the  storage  space  as-
signed to  a particular user to allow many users to use the same storage re-
source.
Most of the important  Internet  standards  to  date have  been coordinat-
ing standards-standards  such  as  TCP/IP, FTP, and  HTML.  The  Internet
community has  demonstrated  well its  ability to  develop  and  deploy coor-
dinating standards;  this is the genius  in organizations  such  as the Internet
Engineering  Task  Force  ("IETF').2  But in  the  future,  most  of the  most
significant debates  about  standards will be  debates about  regulating stan-
dards-about  standards  that  allow  the  government  to  carry  its  policy
choices into effect, whether or not those choices are the choices of bottom-
up organizations like the IETF.
The Net's success  with standards in the future, then, depends upon  the
standards  at  stake.  And  its  success  with coordinating  standards  will  not
necessarily entail a similar success with regulatory standards.
II.  REGULABILITY
That's the  distinction;  now the  history. It's important  that we  remark
how  the  debate  about  the  regulation  of  cyberspace  has  changed.  Three
years  ago  the world  was techno-libertarian.  Frustrated  sorts from our bu-
reaucratic  age looked to cyberspace  as a place where regulation  would not
work, and hence  as a place  where people would  be free.  "Free" had  two
senses for these sorts-first, life in cyberspace  was  free from any regula-
tion, and second,  life  there was  free  from regulation  by government. Life
1.  See generally Charles L. Hendrick, Introduction to the Internet Protocols (July
3,  1987)  <http://www.shiva.com/prod/techinfo/ip-intro.html>  (giving  history  as  well  as
explanation of TCP/IP).
2.  The  IETF is the  single  most important Internet  standards  body,  though it func-
tions in a very different manner from ordinary standards  bodies. Membership of the IETF
is  open,  and  standards get  adopted 'only if implemented.  See Internet  Engineering  Task
Force,  Overview  of  the  IETF,  (visited  Apr.  1,  1999)  <http://www.ietf.org/
overview.html>.  See also Scott Bradner,  The Internet Engineering Task Force, in OPEN
SOURCES:  VOICES  FROM  THE  OPEN  SOURCE  REVOLUTION  47  (Chris  DiBona et  al. eds.,
1999).
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in  cyberspace,  libertarians  promised,  was  unregulated  and  unregulable.
Behavior there was beyond the government's reach.
These were the ideas that defined first-generation  thought about cyber-
space  and  law.  Law  such  as  copyright was  dead,  lyricists  such  as John
Perry  Barlow  sang.3  Law  was  fundamentally  threatened,  lawyers  such  as
Post  and  Johnson  warned.4  The  Net  would  be  a  world  where  freedom
reigned,  and  in  some  techno-Marxist  way,  governments  would  have  no
choice but to wither away.
These  ideas did  not  go  unchallenged.  Rather, there  were  a few  "cra-
zies"  around at the time who thought quite differently  about regulation  on
the  Net. I met two at a conference  at Emory  Law School  three  years ago,
where  they  were  busy challenging  these  then-commonplace  ideas  about
the unregulated life of cyberspace.
One was  then  an assistant professor  from Fordham:  Joel Reidenberg.
About the claim that life in cyberspace was free-unregulated  at all-Rei-
denberg had a very different  view. Life in cyberspace,  Reidenberg  argued,
was regulated  as any form of life was. This regulation, however, was built
into the code.5  This form of regulation he called lex informatica, 6  and this
lex,  he  maintained,  defines  what behavior  is  possible  in  cyberspace  and
what  values  cyberspace  will uphold.7  Whether  these  are  values  of  ano-
nymity or privacy  or free speech  or access,  it is this law that  makes those
values possible.
But the lex informatica, he argued,  was not a law that was fixed. 8 The
architectures  of cyberspace could be changed.  The values  that cyberspace
embraces could be different. There is no nature to the way that cyberspace
3.  See,  e.g.,  John  Perry  Barlow,  Keynote Address, Symposium  on  "Fundamental
Rights on the Information Superhighway" at the New  York  University School  of Law,
1994 ANN.  SURV.  AM.  L. 355  (1994);  John Perry Barlow,  The Economy of Ideas, WIRED,
Mar. 1994, at  84.
4.  See, e.g.,  David  R. Johnson  & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law
in Cyberspace, 48 STAN.  L. REV.  1367,  1375 (1996).
5.  By "code"  I  mean  generally  the software  and hardware  that  constitutes  cyber-
space  as it is. That code might be divided between the basic net protocols of TCP/IP, and
the applications  that run on those protocols. As I explain more below, it is the  application
space that is the most important target of regulation.
6.  See Joel  R.  Reidenberg,  Governing Networks and Rule-Making in Cyberspace,
45 EMORY L.J. 911,  929 (1996).  See also Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The For-
mulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX.  L.  REV.  553  (1998)
[hereinafter Reidenberg, Lex Informatica].
7.  See Reidenberg, Lex Informatica,  supra note 6, at 568-73.
8.  See id. at 579-81.
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is built-no nature, simply code. This code could be made to  be very dif-
ferent from  what  it currently  is.  It  could  be  made,  that  is,  to  embrace  a
very different set of values.
The other crazy  was  Pam Samuelson, then  a professor  at the Univer-
sity of Pittsburgh. Samuelson challenged the second idea-that cyberspace
could not be regulated  by  government.  For  as  Samuelson  saw  it, the law
was already threatening an important regulation of life in cyberspace.9  Not
directly, of course, but indirectly-through a  series of changes  threatened
by  the  Administration's  White  Paper  on  Intellectual  Property. 1 0  These
changes,  designed  to  increase  the law's  protection  for intellectual  prop-
erty,  threatened  to  fundamentally  queer  the  architectures  of  cyberspace.
Laws  would  have  their effect,  if only indirectly,  by  inducing  changes  in
the lex that Reidenberg spoke of.
Time  works  changes.  The  views  of these  two  crazies  have  now  be-
come mainstream.  Everyone now gets how the architecture of cyberspace
is,  in  effect,  a regulator.  Everyone  now understands  that  the freedom  or
control that  one knows  in  cyberspace  is a function  of its code.  Cookies"'
mean  less  privacy;  choice  about  cookies  means  more  privacy.  A  world
without P3P  12  is a  world with less control over privacy;  a world with P3P
is a world with more control over privacy. A world with PICS13 is a world
where  speech  is less free;  a world without PICS is, well, let's  say, nice.' 4
The differences  in these worlds  are differences in the code of these worlds.
Different code, different regulation, different worlds.
9.  See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property  Issues Raised by the National
Information Infrastructure,  454 PLI/PAT 43  (1996).
10.  Information  Infrastructure  Task Force,  Working Group  on  Intellectual  Property
Rights, Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure:  The  Report of
the Working Group on Intellectual Property  Rights (Sept.  1995)  <http://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/>.
11.  Cookies allow web  sites to track users  over multiple visits. See generally David
Whalen,  The  Unofficial  Cookie  FAQ,  Version  2.51  (visited  Apr.  1,  1999)
<http://www.cookiecentral.com/faq/index.shtml>.
12.  "The  Platform for  Privacy  Preferences  Project  (P3P)  enables  Web  sites  to  ex-
press  their privacy  practices  and  enables  users to  exercise  preferences  over  those  prac-
tices."  World  Wide  Web  Consortium, Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P)  Syntax
Specification (working  draft) (July  2,  1998)  <http://www.w3.org/ITR/WD-P3P1O-syntax-
19980702>.
13.  The Platform for Internet Content Selection (PICS)  is a protocol  for facilitating
the  rating  and  filtering  of content  on  the  Internet.  See World  Wide  Web  Consortium,
Platform  for  Internet  Content  Selection  (PICS)  (last  modified  Jan.  3,  1998)
<http://www.w3.org/pics>.
14.  See Lawrence Lessig,  Tyranny in the Infrastructure,  WIRED, Jul.  1997, at 96.
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And  so too do most now see how government  might have a role in this
regulation. Smart governments will regulate, but not by directly regulating
the  behavior of  people  in  cyberspace.  Smart  governments  will  instead
regulate by regulating the code that regulates the behavior of people  in cy-
berspace.  Cyberspace's  code will  become  the  target  of regulation.'5  The
future will be littered with examples  of government trying to  intervene  to
assure that cyberspace  is architected  in  a way to protect  government's in-
terests.  Whether  those  interests  will  be  interests  against  copyright  man-
agement circumvention1 6 or interests  in favor of encryption control, 17 the
government  will  increasingly  see that  the most  efficient  target of regula-
tion is not people but binary code. Enslave the code while telling the world
that you  are  leaving  the  space free' 8-this  is the  formula  for  taming  the
liberty that cyberspace now provides.
Two  important  conclusions  follow  from  the  arguments  of these  two
crazies. First, if code is a kind of law, then we should focus, as we do with
real-space  law,  on  the freedoms  and  the  constraints  built into  this  code,
and on how  these freedoms  and  constraints  are  changing.  And second,  if
governments  regulate  code,  then  we  should  think  about  the  limits  that
should  constrain  government's  power to  regulate.  For  our constitutional
tradition  is  one  which  limits  governmental  power  by  limiting  govern-
ment's direct legislative  action; yet the future of the government's regula-
tion of the Net is a future where government regulates by indirect legisla-
tive action. Constitutional  values  should constrain  both indirect and direct
regulation; so far it is not clear that they do.'
9
15.  For a great  example  of regulation  of the  code, see  the  Oxley-Manton  Amend-
ment  to  the  Security  and Freedom  Through  Encryption  (SAFE)  Act,  H.R.  695,  105th
Cong. (1997),  which would  have regulated the  type of permissible  encryption  to be just
that which provided the required governmental  access.
16.  See  Digital  Millennium  Copyright  Act of 1998,  Pub.  L.  No.  105-304,  § 1201,
112 Stat.  2860,  2863-2872  (codified  at  17  U.S.C.  § 1201)  (1998).  For  a critique  of this
anti-circumvention  provision,  see  Pamela  Samuelson,  Intellectual Property and  the
Digital Economy:  Why  the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need  to  be  Revised,  14
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 519 (1999).
17.  See supra  note  15.
18.  See,  e.g.,  WILLIAM  J.  CLINTON  AND  ALBERT  GORE,  JR.,  A  FRAMEWORK  FOR
GLOBAL  ELECTRONIC  COMMERCE  (1997),  available  at  <http://www.iitf.nist.gov/
eleccomm/ecomm.htm>.
19.  My favorite  example  is Rust v.  Sullivan, 500 U.S.  173. (1991),  in which the  Su-
preme Court upheld an indirect  means of discouraging  abortion,  something  the govern-
ment cannot do  directly.  See Lawrence  Lessig,  The  New Chicago School, 27  J.  LEGAL
STuD. 661,  670, 690-91  (1998).
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IIl. LIMITS ON REGULABILITY
That's the history: Now something about the future. I want to focus on
a new wrinkle in this debate about regulating cyberspace.  We are just be-
ginning  to  understand this new  wrinkle,  yet it may  become the  most im-
portant question about the future of cyberspace  that we have yet seen.
You might think it follows from the commonplace  views of our day-
from those views once held by the crazies  only, but now considered main-
stream  by most-that government is  capable of effectively regulating  the
Net. If  government  can  regulate  the  code,  then  government  can  require
codewriters to build the standards that the government needs into the code.
The future of regulatory standards  under this view, then, would simply  be
a  future  where  the  government  tells  codewriters  how  to  architect  their
code so as to incorporate governmental regulatory standards.
But  in fact,  the  story  is interestingly  more  complicated.  In  fact,  this
power  of  government  depends  upon  a  feature  of  the code-application
space  code 2°-that  has  only recently  become  salient.  This  feature  is  its
ownership. Whether  government  can regulate  code  depends  in part  upon
who controls  that code. If the code  is closed--controlled  by private  for-
profit organizations-then  government's power is assured. But if the code
is open-outside of the control of any particular  private for-profit  organi-
zation-then  the government's  power is threatened.  The more application
space code is open code, the less government can regulate that code.
The reason is  straightforward.  Open code is software  in plain view.  It
is  software  that comes  bundled  with  its  source code  as  well as its object
code.  Object code is the code that the computer reads. If you display it on
your  machine,  it will  appear  as  gibberish.  But  source  code  is  code  that
programmers  can read.2'  It is this  code that allows  a programmer  to open
an open source software  project and see what makes  it tick. By being able
to  see  what  makes  it tick,  open  source  software  makes  transparent  any
control that the code  might carry. For example, if the code carries  a gov-
ernment-mandated  encryption  routine,  that  routine  will  be. apparent  to
open  source  coders.  And  because it  is  apparent,  open  source  coders  can
then choose  whether or not to adopt that portion of an open code project.
For by its nature,  and by the promises  that  it  comes bundled with in the
20.  I define this more infra in the text accompanying note 29.
21.  Compilers  can read  it as well, but  compilers  simply turn this  code from  source
code into object code.
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22
form  of licenses,  any  open  code  software  project  remains  available  for
adopters to modify or improve, however the adopters think best.
Closed code  functions  differently.  It  does  not come  bundled  with  its
source,  which  means  that  its  code  is  hidden  under  a  hood  that  won't
23 open.  Thus adopters or users of closed code cannot as easily detect what
makes  closed code tick. They can't  as easily  see whether it carries within
it a given encryption routine or systems for collecting private data or tech-
nologies  for  monitoring  and  reporting  usage.  Clever  adopters  can  try  to
work it out through reverse engineering 24 or hacking.  But no matter  how
clever  the adopter,  closed  code  will be  harder  to  monitor,  and  harder  to
change than open code. An adopter of open source code who doesn't like a
module  can  simply  substitute  another;  an  adopter of closed  code has  no
equivalently simple choice.25
This difference  is critical  to the question of regulability.  For if the ap-
plication  space  is  built  with  closed  code,  then  the  ability  of adopters  to
change  that  code  is  less  than  it would  be  if the  application  space  were
comprised of open code. If it is harder for adopters to change code, then it
22.  See,  e.g.,  Free  Software  Foundation,  GNU General Public License  Version 2
(June  1991)  <http://www.gnu.ai.mit.edu/copyleft/gpl.html>;  Ira  V.  Heffan,  Note,
Copyleft: Licensing Collaborative Works  in  the Digital Age,  49  STAN.  L.  REv.  1487,
1508  (1997).  ("The  GNU  GPL gives  users  permission  to  copy,  modify,  and  distribute
GNU software conditioned on  the user's  agreement to license  all  derivative versions  un-
der the same terms. Further, users must agree (1) not to establish proprietary rights in the
software;  (2) to provide  the source  code to anyone  to whom they give the object code; (3)
to include in the  software notice of the applicability  of the  GNU GPL; and (4)  to accept
the software without warranties  of any kind.") (footnotes omitted).
23.  The  idea  is  stolen  (but can an  idea  be  stolen?)  from Austin  Bunn,  Under the
Hood, FEED (visited Apr. 1, 1999) <http://www.feedmag.com/oss/ossintro.htmi>.
24.  Though  many licenses expressly  forbid reverse  engineering. See,  e.g.,  Mark  A.
Lemley & David McGowan,  Legal Implications of  Network Economic Effects, 86 CALIF.
L. REv. 479, 528 (1998)  ("Microsoft  has  argued that each of the  100  million-plus copies
of object  code  it sells  are  limited distributions  of trade  secret  information  subject  to  a
'shrinkwrap  license'  agreement that prevents  reverse  engineering,  and  therefore  that no
one can obtain a copy of Microsoft's operating systems without 'agreeing'  not to reverse
engineer it.").  I am with those who believe that copyright's rules about reverse engineer-
ing  should  be  read  to  trump  the  contract promise  to  the  contrary.  See,  e.g.,  Mark  A.
Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87
CALIF. L.  REv.  111  (1999);  Mark A.  Lemley,  The Economics of Improvement in Intel-
lectual Property  Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989 (1997).
25.  Technically, this  is misleading. Programmers  of closed code  do publish applica-
tion program interfaces  (APIs)  that enable others to "plug in" to a closed application.  In
principle, if these were fully transparent,  closed code  would be closer  to open code. The
significant difference  is that closed code APIs still cannot be modified.
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is easier  for governments  to regulate  through that code.  Say  the  govern-
ment has a standard it wishes  to impose on some aspect of the application
space. To the extent  the regulatory standard  gets  imposed  on closed  code,
it is more likely to be adopted by users than the same  regulation  imposed
on  open  code.  If the  adopters don't like  the  regulatory  standard  (which,
given  the  nature  of many regulatory  standards,  is  not unlikely),  adopters
can more easily swap out the regulated code if they use open  code than if
they use closed code.
An example offered by Peter Harter at this conference  makes the point
well.  Netscape  has  turned its code  for Netscape  Communicator  over to  a
version  of the open  source  software  movement.  Its  code  is controlled  by
an  organization  called  Mozilla, but  its source  is  open.  When  Mozilla re-
leases a new version, adopters around the world are permitted to download
the source code, and adopt it or modify it as they wish.26
The French government didn't get this idea. They wanted Netscape to
modify the SSL standard  to enable  decryption  of SSL transactions,  and
so they asked Netscape  to implement  the request. But as Netscape report-
edly told the French,  there is really very little that Netscape  can do to en-
able the  cracking  of SSL, and  it  is  easy  to  see  why.28 Even  if Netscape
built a French version  of SSL, enabling  the  French  to spy  whenever  the
French  government  wants,  whether  that  version  got  used depends  upon
whether it is adopted. And even  if Netscape  put the French  SSL version
into the code of Netscape  Communicator, there is no reason to expect that
adopters  of the code wouldn't simply substitute a different  version of SSL
for the French spy-enabled  version. Whether the SSL code  is adopted is a
decision that rests with the users, not with Netscape.
26.  See  The  Mozilla  Organization,  Our  Mission  (visited  Apr.  1,  1999)
<http://www.mozilla.org/mission.html>  (announcing  that  Netscape  Communicator  and
its  source code  would be available  free of charge,  and describing  mozilla.org's  role as a
"clearing-house  for  the  newly-available  Netscape  source  ...  to  collect  changes,  help
authors  synchronize  their  work,  and periodically  make new  source releases  which incor-
porate the best work of the net as a whole").
27.  SSL,  the  Secure  Sockets  Layer,  is  a  security  protocol  developed  by  Netscape
which  "provides  data  encryption,  server authentication,  message  integrity,  and  optional
client authentication  for a TCP/IP connection."  Netscape  Communications Corp.,  Secure
Sockets  Layer  (visited  Apr.  7,  1999)  <http://home.netscape.com/security/techbriefs/
ssl.html>.
28.  Technically,  there are  two reasons why  there is little that Netscape  can  do here.
One  is that SSL is an  open standard,  which Netscape doesn't control.  But the  second is
the reason I am focusing  on here:  Even if it could control it, its "control"  depends upon
whether the code is open or closed.
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Harter's example is an instance of my more general point:  to the extent
that code  remains open, it is harder for  government to regulate;  to the ex-
tent it is closed, it is easier. Had the French demanded a change in a part of
Netscape's  code  before  Netscape  had  given  its  code  to  Mozilla, then  it
would  have  been  much  harder  for  adopters  to  identify  and  disable  that
code.  But after  the code  is in  the  commons,  governments'  power is  less.
Thus  my  point: the  regulability  of the  application  space  turns in  part  on
whether the application space is open.
That's the claim, but it requires some qualifications.
First, my  argument  turns  upon  the  nature  of the  "application  space"
code.  This  is not the  distinction  between  operating  systems  and applica-
tions,  but rather  the  distinction between  the  basic  Internet  protocols  and
the applications  (or "ends")  that depend upon or use these  protocols.  It is
the design philosophy of the Net to keep the protocols simple and general,
and to build sophistication and complexity into the ends.29 It is possible to
imagine  the  government  trying to regulate  the Internet's  basic  protocols.
But  because  these  are  coordinating  standards  that  effect  very  little  sub-
stantive  control  on  the  content  of the  Net,  they  are  unlikely  to  be  the
source of any powerful or significant regulation. Regulation, or regulatory
standards, if they  are  to  be  effective,  would have  to  be embedded  in the
application space code.
Second,  my  argument  is  not  that a  world with  open  code,  or mostly
open  code,  couldn't  be  regulated.  In  my  view,  there  could  be  relatively
small  shifts in  the  architecture  of the Net-in the functionality built into
the  application  space-that would  fundamentally  enable  state  regulation,
even  if that  application  space  were  open  code.  If the  Internet  became
"certificate rich"-meaning  that many people carried and used digital  cer-
tificates 31 while  "on"  the  Net-local  government's  power  to regulate  the
Net could fundamentally  increase,  whether or not the basic certificate  ar-
chitectures were open or closed code.
29.  This design is more efficient,  for building complexity into  the protocols  would
not necessarily  lead to simple ends. See, e.g., Jerome H. Saltzer et al., End-to-End Argu-
ments in System Design, in INTEGRATED BROADBAND NETWORKS  30 (Amit Bhargava ed.,
1991).
30.  See Lawrence  Lessig,  What Things Regulate Speech: CDA 2.0 vs.  Filtering,  38
JURIMETRICS J. 629 (1998).
31.  Digital  certificates  "allow  verification  of the  claim that  a specific  [encryption]
key does in fact belong  to a  specific individual.  Certificates  help prevent someone  from
...  impersonat[ing]  someone  else."  RSA  Laboratories,  FAQ  4.0-Frequently Asked
Questions About  Today's Cryptography (visited  Apr.  7,  1999)  <http://www.rsa.com/
rsalabs/faq/html/4-1-3-1 0.html>.
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Third, my  argument  is also not that a  world with  more closed  code is
always  a world that is more regulable.  Some closed  code would not affect
the Net's regulability.  It matters little whether solitaire programs or certain
utility programs  are open or closed code, for there is little connection  be-
tween  them  and  any  regulation  the government  might  impose.  (So  long,
that is, as  they are as  they say they  are.)  Thus the  point about regulability
is not a point about necessity; it is instead a point about possibility.
And finally, following from the third:  my argument  is not a  criticism
of closed  code  in general.  I  don't believe  that  the best possible  world  is
one where all code is  open, any more than I believe that the best possible
real  world  is  one  where  all  property  is  public  or  part  of the  commons.
There  is  a  mix  between  open  and  closed  spaces  in  real  space  and  there
should  be  a similar  mix between  open  and  closed  spaces  in  cyberspace.
The only enemy  is the extremes--either  a  world that was  perfectly prop-
ertized (either completely, or selectively  if selected  well), or  a world  that
permitted  no  closed development.  Whatever  economic  model  might  sup-
port projects  like the GNU/Linux  OS, 32  there is  no reason  to believe  the
same model would work for every coding project. 33
To  many in the open code  movement, this  whole  argument  about the
values in  open  source  software  might seem  quite  odd.  To them,  the  real
issue with open source software  is its power. Its real virtue  is its amazing
efficiency-its  robustness  and  reliability.  And  no  doubt,  if these  are  its
virtues, they are valuable indeed.
But my point is not to question any claim about efficiency. My point is
simply that there are other issues at stake as well.34 The architecture of cy-
berspace embeds  a set of values,  as  it embeds  or constitutes  the possible.
But beyond the values built into this architecture, there are values that are
implicated by  the ownership  of code.  Its  ownership  can enable  a  kind of
32.  For a description of Linux, see Linux Online,  What is Linux (last modified Mar.
16,  1999) <http://www.linux.org/info/index.html>.
33.  See Brian Behlendorf, Open Source as a Business Strategy, in OPEN  SOURCES:
VOICES FROM THE OPEN SOURCE REVOLUTION  149 (Chris DiBona et al. eds.,  1999).
34.  This, I take it, is the  strong and true point that Free Software Foundation founder
Richard  Stallman makes.  See Richard  Stallman, Why  Software Should Be Free (Apr. 24,
1992)  <http://www.fsf.org/philosophy/shouldbefree.html>  (arguing that  software  owner-
ship is harmful  because fewer people use the program,  none of the users can  adapt or fix
the program,  and  other developers  cannot learn from  the program,  or base  new work  on
it). See generally Free  Software Foundation,  Philosophy of the GNU Project  (last modi-
fied Mar. 27,  1999) <http://www.fsf.org/philosophy/philosophy.html>.
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check  on  government's  power-a  separation  of powers  that  checks  the
extent that government can reach. Just as our Constitution embeds the val-
ues  of the Bill of Rights  while also embedding  the protections  of separa-
tion of powers, 35  so too should  we think about the values that cyberspace
embeds, as well as its structure.
However  efficient  open  code  may  be,  arguments  about  open  source
must also consider the questions that these values raise. For in my view, it
makes as much sense to promote open  source on efficiency  grounds alone
as it does to promote democracy on grounds  of economic wealth  alone.  It
may well be that democracies  are more wealthy  than other forms  of gov-
ernment, just as  it may well  be  that open  source software  is more robust
than  others.  But  it is a thin conception  of value  that would see wealth  or
efficiency as the only, or most important, value at stake.
35.  See Morrison v.  Olson, 487 U.S.  654, 710 (1988)  (Scalia,  J.,  dissenting)  ("While
the  separation of powers may prevent us from righting every wrong, it does so in order to
ensure  that we do not lose liberty.").
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